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Question 
• What can the government of Malawi learn from the use of economic 
empowerment/indigenisation and affirmative action policies? 
o Are there specific lessons for Malawi on the implementation of indigenisation and 
empowerment policies in other countries, including: Botswana, Zimbabwe and 












This rapid review focusses on what the government of Malawi can learn from the implementation 
of indigenisation, economic empowerment and affirmative action policies in other countries. The 
review specifically looks at the lessons for Malawi on the implementation of indigenisation 
policies drawing on the experiences from the following countries: Botswana, Zimbabwe and 
South Africa.  
The literature used for this evaluation was from a variety of sources, including the following types 
of literature: published journal articles and academic theses; grey sources and published reports. 
There was a dearth of literature on empowerment and indigenisation policies in Malawi. This was 
not the case for South Africa and Zimbabwe where there has been a lot of research on this 
subject. Noteworthy, is that few independent monitoring and evaluation studies on the 
implementation of BEE and indigenisation policies, as well as their impact across all countries in 
this review were found. 
Findings from the review (see for example, Chiwunze, 2014) show that where indigenisation 
policies are implemented incrementally, without sweeping and radical changes, the risks in terms 
of discouraging foreign investments to the country are minimised because there is an element of 
predictability in the formulation and implementation of these policies. Empowerment legislation 
should also be introduced and implemented transparently with clear regulations for each sector 
of the economy. Botswana and South Africa are examples of an incremental approach to 
adopting empowerment policies for Black economic advancement. When empowerment policies 
are populist and politicised so that it favours a ruling elite and its network of supporters, this 
damages economic development and discourages investment into the economy of a country. In 
these instances, as the countries in this review show, empowerment programmes do not benefit 
the majority of economically marginalised citizens (Warikandwa and Osode, 2017).  
In general, black empowerment programmes require financial resources for the setting up and 
funding of institutions to support the programmes; for training; as well as for setting up 
independent oversight bodies to regulate its implementation and ensure compliance. Resources 
and capacity are also needed to monitor implementation progress.  For the countries in this 
review, resources and capacity were not sufficient to ensure that Black Economic Empowerment 
programmes were implemented so that they reached the majority of marginalised citizens 
Evidence from Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe reveals that there is a need for an 
independent oversight body to oversee the implementation of Black Economic Empowerment 
regulations. This body should have the ability to impose sanctions where empowerment 
regulations are violated. In order to avoid corruption, business fronting and irregular practices in 
the implementation of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), governments need to set up a 
monitoring and evaluation system to ensure that BEE procurement policies benefit ordinary 
citizens rather than a well-connected elite. BEE programmes can be effective for redressing 
imbalances in society, but there is a need for continual assessments of progress and 
adjustments to policies where necessary. 
 
 
   
 
3 
The following key observations emerge from this review: 
• Definitions of indigenisation generally refer to those policies which result in a more equal 
distribution of opportunity and wealth in an economy from foreign or settler populations to 
indigenous or national populations (Zvoushe, Uwizeyimana and Auriacombe, 2017). 
• Depending on the political context, indigenisation can be used by a government to 
exclude or give preference to different social groupings in a country. This can be on the 
basis of: race, ethnic identity and party affiliation/loyalty or; foreigners versus local-
nationals. (Zvoushe, Uwizeyimana and Auriacombe, 2017). 
• Malawi’s National Economic Empowerment policy Statement (NEEP) and Action Plan 
developed in the early 2000’s was an attempt to develop an integrated approach for the 
empowerment of indigenous Malawians which has developed more than 40 different 
types of empowerment initiatives since the 1960’s. Despite these initiatives, Malawi 
remains one of the poorest countries in the world (Deloitte, 2004). 
A review of evidence on indigenisation policies in Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa 
highlighted the following key insights.  
Botswana 
• Botswana has not followed the populist post-independence trend that some southern 
African states adopted to nationalise foreign-owned capital. Instead. Botswana continues 
to encourage and promote enterprise development by being open to various types of 
private investment, including investments by exclusively foreign-owned companies and; 
joint ventures comprising citizen and foreign ownership (Gergis,1999, Valentine, 1993); 
• Botswana did not adopt a sweeping approach to empowerment legislation implemented 
suddenly. Its approach minimised risk of loss of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by 
introducing indigenisation policies incrementally and by incorporating this policy into other 
legislation enacted from the early 2000’s (Chiwunze, 2014); and  
• With respect to land reform, Botswana’s approach has been viewed positively because it 
managed to preserve land rights granted by the colonial administration and at the same 




• Zimbabwe has adopted a populist approach to indigenisation which has resulted in the 
destruction of its economy and impoverishment of its citizens (Marazanye, 2016, 
Chingono, 2019); 
• Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) that was implemented in the 
2000’s violated the Rule of Law and led to the further decline of its economy due to 
international economic sanctions imposed on it (Ndakaripa, 2017); 
• The politicisation and radicalisation of Zimbabwe’s empowerment policies under its 
Empowerment Act passed in 2007 led to state institutions such as the Small Enterprises 
Development Corporation (SEDCO), failing and this negatively affected the development 
of the SME sector and economic growth (Nyamunda, 2016); 
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• Zimbabwe’s populist empowerment policies have resulted in corruption, businesses 
fronting and the enrichment of the elite and those supporting the ruling party 
(Warikandwa and Osode, 2017); and  
• The lack of policy certainty with respect to the implementation of the Indigenisation and 
Economic Empowerment Act (IEEA) in Zimbabwe has negatively affected Foreign Direct 
Investment inflows into the country. Clear regulations underpinning IEEA are necessary 
for each sector of the economy (Chiwunze, 2014). 
 
South Africa  
• South Africa has not adopted a radical or populist approach to Black Economic 
empowerment based on a transfer of assets. Policies have been implemented 
incrementally in successive waves of Broad -Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-
BBEE) and improvements to the policy have been made at each successive stage 
(Kamusoko (2019);  
• In South Africa Black Economic Empowerment is monitored through a balanced 
scorecard based on a points preference system which is implemented in a transparent 
way which investors favour (Marazanye, 2016); 
• There is an independent oversight body to investigate complaints, corruption and 
business fronting relating to the implementation of South Africa’s Black Economic 
Empowerment programme. Harsh penalties can be imposed on those companies and 
individuals who violate the B-BBE regulations (Warikandwa and Osode, 2017); 
• Although B-BBEE has had some successes in the advancement of the black population 
in the workforce and the growth of Black owned businesses, economic transformation of 
the society has been slow. Unemployment is still high and South Africa remains one of 
the most unequal countries in the world (The World Bank, 2018); 
• The are some systemic and policy weaknesses in South Africa’s B-BBEE system, for 
example, B-BBEE continues to favour the elite rather than broader society. Corruption 
and fronting remain as obstacles to successful implementation of the system to benefit 
society more broadly (Marazanye, 2016, Shava, 2016); and  
• Land reform in South Africa has adopted an incremental approach, guided by the South 
African Constitution. Progress has been slow with the implementation of the land reform 
programme as a result of complex legal processes. The majority of agricultural land is 
still owned by Whites and the deadline for 30% Black ownership of agricultural land has 
been extended to 2025 (Africa Institute, 2013). 
2. Introduction 
Defining the concepts of indigenisation/economic empowerment 
and affirmative action as they apply in southern African states 
Indigenisation is often used as a policy tool in African states for reshaping their economies 
towards a more equal distribution of wealth following colonialism and/or apartheid, where there 
have been sizeable European settler populations. Zvoushe, Uwizeyimana and Auriacombe 
(2017,p.2) note that there is little ambiguity in the meaning of indigenisation in most parts of the 
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world from, Latin America, Asia to Africa. Scholars generally agree that it refers to “the transfer of 
wealth mostly from ‘foreigners’ to ‘natives’ through widened participation of the latter in national 
economies”. In some countries such as Zimbabwe indigenisation encompasses multiple levels of 
exclusion, depending on the context. These include, racial (Black versus White/or settler versus 
local black populations), party (party loyalists versus non-loyalists) and nationality (Zimbabweans 
versus non-Zimbabweans) domains (Zvoushe, Uwizeyimana and Auriacombe, 2017).  
Indigenisation can also take many forms, including (Zvoushe, Uwizeyimana and Auriacombe, 
2017 
• Indigenisation of ownership, entailing giving economic ownership to locals/nationals;  
• Indigenisation of control, whereby indigenous populations are given control of businesses 
through their elevation into leadership positions; and  
• Indigenisation of manpower, through policies such as affirmative action entailing moving 
people up the job ladder.  
The term ‘empowerment’ and ‘indigenisation’ overlap. Empowerment refers to a process 
whereby people in society are given the means to improve the quality of their own lives through 
for example better access to economic opportunities (Gergis, 1999). Marazanye (2016) argues 
that indigenisation and empowerment are terms that can be used interchangeably, and one can 
lead to another. Economic empowerment can be a product of indigenisation or indigenisation 
may lead to various economic empowerment policies.   Affirmative action is another strategy 
government can utilise to address past injustices, or economic imbalances and is typically used 
in the context of employment practices and addressing social imbalances in the workforce 
Marazanye (2016). 
 
Indigenisation policies in Malawi 
Chingaipe and Leftwich (2007) note that an Indigenous Business Association (IBAM) was 
established in 2003 out of frustration expressed by local Malawian businesses that large and 
lucrative contracts from government were being awarded to Asians and foreigners, without 
requiring local partnerships. The need to correct imbalances in Malawi’s economy together with 
addressing poverty, motivated the government to develop policies to improve the lives and 
economic wellbeing of its citizens. Malawi has therefore developed various policies to promote 
the economic development of its citizens. This includes the Malawi Poverty Alleviation Strategy 
(MPRSP) finalised in 2002. This policy provided direction and costed-activities to target poverty 
reduction and pro-poor growth in the country. The main purpose of the MPRSP was to facilitate 
economic empowerment. (Deloitte, 20041). 
A further policy was developed to provide more detail on how pro-poor growth would be 
stimulated. The Growth Strategy Paper (GSP) identified specific sectors in the economy with the 
greatest prospects for growth. Despite these policy developments, most Malawians were still 
 
1 Commissioned by the Malawi Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 2004 
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involved in low-value small scale enterprises. Only foreigners and a minority of Malawians were 
involved in lucrative large-scale business operations (Deloitte, 2004). For this reason, the 
development of a National Economic Empowerment Statement (NEEP) and Action Programme 
(AP) was commissioned by the Malawian Ministry of Economic Planning and Development and 
drafted in 2004 (Deloitte, 2004). 
The NEEP was a recognition that since the 1960’s Malawi has had more than 40 different types 
of empowerment initiatives and some are still operational while others are no longer in existence. 
In the process of developing NEEP, lessons were learned from earlier empowerment policies 
which informed the development of NEEP. These lessons included: 
• Gaps in the supply of services such as training and loanable funds to support 
empowerment; 
• Politicisation of the policies leading in some cases to defaults on loans, particularly those 
credit schemes promoted by politicians. This resulted in borrowers perceiving loans as 
non-repayable grants; and  
• A lack of an integrated approach to empowerment policies. 
The NEEP policy statement targeted indigenous Malawians, recognising that they faced many 
constraints in the achievement of their full potential to prosper in business activities (Deloitte, 
2004). The policy called for an integrated approach to dealing with various causes of 
disempowerment, targeting the marginalised and poor in Malawi. The policy covered human 
resource development, employment equity, enterprise development, preferential procurement 
and investment and ownership, including managing, owning and control of productive assets 
(Deloitte, 2004). In terms of the Action Plan for NEEP, factors identified as important to the 
success of the programme were summarised into seven key pillars (Deloitte, 2004): 
• The creation of an institutional framework for empowerment. 
• The development of a regulatory framework. 
• Access to services and capital. 
• Access to science and technology and means of production. 
• Access to rural development. 
• Capacity building for economic development. 
• Improving infrastructure. 
 
Since the commissioning of the development of NEEP there does not appear to have been a 
substantial improvement in the lives of the poor and there is no evidence that NEEP was 
concretised into an integrated formal policy. Malawi remains one of the poorest countries in the 
world (The World Bank, 2020). However, guided by its Growth and Development Strategy 
(MGDS), which is a series of five-year plans, its economy has slowly improved with increasing 
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growth rates in recent years (3.5% in 2018 and 4.4% in 2019). The economy remains heavily 
reliant on agriculture, employing some 80% of the population (The World Bank, 2020). 
3. Lessons from indigenisation policies in other southern 
African states 
Botswana 
Botswana viewed economic empowerment as a set of policies and programmes customised to 
support the Batswana people who were disempowered by temporary residents from other 
countries. These new residents were able to economically dominate the indigenous population 
through superior educational resources and skills and entrepreneurship capacity (Gergis, 1999). 
Valentine (1993) notes that Botswana has not followed the post-independence populist trend of 
some African states, which has been to nationalise foreign-owned companies and set up state -
owned enterprises. Botswana has continued to encourage and promote private enterprise 
including local citizen, foreign-owned and joint-owned companies. Kamusoko (2019) notes that 
Botswana did not follow the trend towards socialism that was preferred in other southern African 
states such as Zimbabwe, Namibia and Tanzania. Instead, Botswana adopted a hybrid path 
entailing capitalism and state intervention (Kamusoko, 2019). Botswana’s transition to 
independence may also have shaped its approach to empowerment and indigenisation because 
even after it became independent, the colonial civil service system remained in place and the 
country continued to be dependent on European administrative and technical skills. This led to 
the need for local empowerment initiatives in areas which were neglected (Kamusoko, 2019). 
Concerns about slow employment growth and low citizen participation in the non-agricultural 
productive sector of the economy, led to the appointment of a Presidential Commission on 
Economic Opportunities (Valentine, 1993). To address the marginalisation of Botswana’s 
population from the economy, the Commission recommended the introduction of the Financial 
Assistance Plan (FAP) in 1982. The purpose of FAP was to provide financial equity to citizen-
owned productive enterprises. This was done through giving grants to new businesses and to 
help with the expansion of existing ones in the manufacturing, agricultural production and small-
scale mining sectors (Valentine, 1993). FAP was administered by the Ministry of Finance and 
Development (Valentine, 1993). To support local businesses, the FAP programme provided a 
capital grant to small businesses; a labour (employment) grant; a training grant and a sales grant 
(Valentine, 1993). 
Under FAP’s new industrial development policy, the government introduced an industrial 
reservation scheme. This involved reserving industries involving relatively low-level technological 
skills levels for local citizens (Valentine, 1993).  Foreign owned enterprises were able to operate 
in sectors involving more complex manufacturing at a larger scale of production. In this way, 
strong support was provided for indigenous entrepreneurs and at the same time the growth of 
foreign owned- enterprises was not impeded (Valentine, 1993). 
Although FAP was successful in its early phase of implementation by contributing significantly to 
growth of local industries, by 2000 following a fourth evaluation of the scheme, it was decided to 
end it. This was because of the existence of fraud and abuse of the system as a result of 
deficient monitoring and administration capacity of the programme especially in relation to small-
scale businesses. The scheme was then replaced with the Citizen Entrepreneurial Development 
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Agency (CIDA) in 2001 (Motswapong and Grynberg, 2014). This scheme had similar objectives 
to FAP, including employment creation for citizens as well as promoting Botswana’s indigenous 
entrepreneurs. Themba (2015) notes that the implementation of CIDA has had challenges. 
Operational challenges have included project monitoring, loan processing and training and 
mentoring. The performance of the scheme has been mixed. For example, it has created only a 
small number of jobs and this may be attributed to the limited growth of CIDA funded enterprises. 
However, the programme has been successful in creating a relatively large number of citizen-
owned businesses that have been competing well in the domestic economy (Themba, 2015).  
In the industrial sector, a Citizen Empowerment Programme was developed through providing 
opportunities and support to the local population This entailed citizens taking responsibility for 
their own advancement but the state also provided incentives to support local businesses 
(Gergis, 1999). The purpose of the Citizen Empowerment Programme was to increase 
employment and income generating opportunities for as many Batswana people as possible and 
the specific policy tools to achieve this are through the following interventions (Gergis, 1999): 
• Financial support through increasing their access to credit; 
• Enterprise development by improving skill levels through training; 
• The development of marketing strategies for locally produced goods and services; 
• Improved bargaining strategies for employees to facilitate higher wages; 
• Job creation through supporting more labour-intensive business; and  
• Customising training and education that responds to industry needs. 
 
Botswana did not enact sweeping empowerment legislation in its approach to indigenisation. The 
gradualist and clear approach it adopted appeared to minimise the risk of loss of Foreign Direct 
Inflows (FDI) into the country. FDI is critically important to a country’s economy because it 
facilitates economic growth through the use of new technologies and employment creation 
(Chiwunze 2014).  Indigenisation policy was implemented incrementally in Botswana and nested 
in various laws highlighted overleaf.  
 
Chiwunze (2014) notes that joint ventures are permitted in the sectors (see Table 1) up to 49% of 
foreign participation, subject to approval by the Minister of Trade and Industry. The 
empowerment policy is further limited to facilitating access to financial resources and ownership 
of assets. The policy also lacks enforcement regulations. 
Based on data on Foreign Direct Inflows (FDI) to Botswana, Chiwunze, 2014 believes that 
Botwana’s empowerment programme has had a minimal negative impact on FDI inflows between 
1985 and 2012.  
  
   
 
9 
Table 1:Nested empowerment legislation and sectors 
Legislation Sectors with empowerment Component 
Industrial Development Amendment 
Regulations, 2008 
Reserves small-scale manufacturing for Botswana 
Citizens or companies wholly owned by Botswana 
citizens 
Trade Act 2008 Reserves retail companies with less than 100 
employees 
Liquor Act 2003 Reserves bars, night clubs and bottle stores for 
citizens 
Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act 
2001 
Preferential treatment to Botswana citizens or wholly-
owned Botswana companies in state procurement 
processes 
Source: Author’s own. Data taken from Chiwunze (2014), https://www.polity.org.za/article/economic-empowerment-and-foreign-
direct-investment-the-cases-of-botswana-south-africa-and-zimbabwe-2014-02-13  
 
With respect to land reform in Botswana, the country has taken an incrementalist approach 
introducing modest and gradual changes to land tenure whilst strengthening its administrative 
capacity and processes to support land management (Adams and Kalabamu, 2003). There are 
more than ten departments and agencies involved in land management currently (Kalabamu, 
2000).  Botswana’s land reform has been gradualist in nature with a continual conversion of state 
land (formerly known and Crown land) back to customary land tenure, increasing its share from 
47% at independence to 71% of the country’s land presently (Kalabamu, 2000). State land has 
decreased from 48% to 23% and freehold land ownership has increased slightly from 5% to 6%. 
To avoid concentration of land in a few individuals or companies, no freehold has been created 
since 1978 (Kalabamu, 2000). Botswana’s land reforms have generally been viewed positively 
because it has managed to balance the preservation of land rights granted by the colonial 
administration whilst at the same time also limiting the increase in private land ownership.  
Secondly, it has been able redistribute land to individuals and companies without eliminating, 
communal land ownership and has been able to deal with landlessness among its present and 
future populations. Finally, the state has been able to maintain a transparent, fair and effective 
land management system through technology and regular reviews and amendments to 
regulations (Kalabamu, 2000). 
 
Zimbabwe 
Seidman (1982) notes that at independence in 1980, Zimbabwe had one of the highest per 
capita incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the majority of the population lived in poverty. 
Agriculture made up a significant share of the economy and was dominated by Whites. Whilst 
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6,000 White-owned farms made up 14% of the country’s GDP, some 320 farm workers employed 
on these farms lived in conditions of poverty not dissimilar to the slaves in 19th century America 
who worked on plantations (Seidman,1982). Marazanye (2016) highlights that Zimbabwe has 
been classified as a low-income country now, having experienced  economic collapse between 
2000 and 2009. As a consequence of the decline of economic performance in the early 2000’s, 
Zimbabwe has also experienced a huge increase in poverty and estimates of unemployment 
range from 65%-80%. In 1980 the country recorded the tenth highest gross national income but 
by 2005 it ranked 34 out of 48 among Sub Saharan countries in terms of this indicator 
(ZIMSTATS 2013, cited in Marazanye, 2016). Although once producing sufficient food for export 
and to feed its own population, Zimbabwe has become food insecure with more than 60% of the 
population unable to obtain enough food (Chingono, 2019). The decline in the economy and 
hyperinflation together with the El Nino weather pattern causing drought has resulted in about 5.5 
million rural Zimbabweans and 2.2 million urban dwellers to become food insecure (Chingono, 
2019).   
According to Zvoushe, Uwizeyimana and Auriacombe (2017) Zimbabwe has had three forms of 
indigenisation, viz: indigenisation of the civil service (which started in 1980); indigenisation of 
land which began in the 1980s but has spanned decades and; indigenisation of the economy 
beginning in the 2000’s.  Zimbabwe has experienced varying levels of indigenisation across the 
key sectors of the economy with agriculture recording the highest level of black ownership at 
over 85% of land owned by indigenous Zimbabweans. The Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Act, 2007(IEEA) is the main piece of legislation directing the indigenisation 
programme. In terms of this Act, the definition of indigenous included any person or descendent 
of that person who was disadvantaged on the grounds of race by unfair discrimination before 
1980 (Ndakaripa, 2017). The legislation made it clear that White people were not viewed as 
indigenous. However, the Act was unclear as to whether Asians, and those of mixed decent 
(Coloureds) were also not regarded as being indigenous (Ndakaripa, 2017).  In terms of the 
IEEA, the governing party gazetted specific regulations, known as the Indigenisation and 
Economic Empowerment Regulations of 2010 as instruments to operationalise the IEEA. In 
terms of these regulations, non-indigenous companies (foreign and White) were required to cede 
51% of their shares to indigenous people over a period of five years (Ndakaripa, 2017). A wide 
range of productive sectors including agriculture, mining and manufacturing were covered within 
these regulations.  
 
Ndakaripa (2017) notes that following the implementation of an Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme, leading to hyper-inflation, increasing unemployment and a collapsing economy 
between 2000 and 2008, the ruling ZANU-PFs populist indigenisation policies were implemented 
with increased vigour. In July 2000, the ruling party initiated the Fast Track Land Reform 
Programme (FTLRP), involving the invasion of White-owned farms by peasant, war veterans, 
securocrats, elite bureaucrats and politicians. Government’s failure to abide by the rule of law led 
to targeted sanctions and isolation by the United States, the European Union, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand. The further worsening economy was the product of the Indigenisation 
programme (Ndakaripa, 2017). Ndakaripa, 2017 notes the joining of forces between ZANU-PF 
and indigenous interest groups was motivated by rent seeking objectives on the one hand, and 
“governments desperate need for allies in its political battles” on the other (Ndakaripa, 2017, 
p.254). 




Table 2: Regulations reserving the sectors for indigenous Zimbabweans in the IEEA 
Processing, production and 
manufacturing 
Services and retail 
Agriculture -primary production of food and 
cash crops 
Transportation 
Grain milling Retail and wholesale trade 
Milk processing Hair salons and barber shops 
Arts and crafts Bakeries 
Tobacco processing, grading and packaging Advertising agencies 
 Valet services 
 Employment Agencies 
Source: Author’s own. Data taken from Ndakaripa (2017), 
https://scholar.ufs.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11660/7767/NdakaripaM.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y  
 
Nyamunda, 2016 notes that the radicalisation of the government Indigenous Economic 
Empowerment policies ultimately led to the politicisation and demise of the Small Enterprise 
Development Corporation (SEDCO). SEDCO was a statutory body established in 1983 to 
support black Small to Medium Enterprises in Zimbabwe.  Nyamunda (2016) notes that the 
achievements of SEDCO were modest and compromised by limited funding. When the IEEA was 
passed in 2007 a more aggressive indigenisation Economic Empowerment programme (IEE) 
programme was followed by government and there were funding cuts to SEDCO, following an 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) that government adopted. Due to a 
shortage of resources following the implementation of ESAP, the state stopped funding SEDCO 
and other statutory corporations that were sustained on government funding. A new and more 
politically connected platform was established in 1990 to support Black business development 
and SEDCO was marginalised. Business lobby groups called for the privatisation of SEDCO, but 
instead government created an SME Ministry, led by a ZANU-PF party leader. This ministry 
became the political mouthpiece of the ruling party’s populist indigenisation policies. SEDCOs 
importance as an institution supporting Black businesses diminished further during this period 
and its role changed towards microfinancing of informal enterprises. The appointed Minister of 
SMEs was more interested in campaigning for the ruling party than implementing proper SME 
support policies (Nyamunda,2016). Although SEDCO had the capacity to play an important role 
in transforming the Zimbabwean economy, the government failed to support it in a sustained 
way. It was not well resourced despite a dedicated management and was eventually replaced 
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under a more radical Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Programme (IEE) (Nyamunda, 
2016). 
Warikandwa and Osode, 2017 argue that the radical populist policies to promote Black economic 
advancement underpinned by the IEEA have benefitted the elite but delivered little to ordinary 
Zimbabweans. The IEEA legislation does not prevent business fronting and it excludes the 
state/government as a specific beneficiary of indigenisation (Warikandwa and Osode, 2017). This 
means that only individuals and juristic persons can benefit from the programme. However, the 
effect of excluding the state as a direct beneficiary is that it encourages business fronting by 
unscrupulous individuals or companies owned by persons related to or connected to government 
officials. Therefore, instead of increasing the participation of the Black majority in the economy of 
Zimbabwe, the policy results in the further enrichment of the elite and politically connected 
(Warikandwa and Osode, 2017). Beneficiaries of Zimbabwe’s IEEA are supporters of ZANU-PF 
and its policies. Although Zimbabwe has an Anti-Corruption Commission to monitor the 
implementation of EEA legislation, its Commissioners are appointed by the President and 
political patronage affects its abilities to perform its functions impartially (Warikandwa and Osode, 
2017).  
Chiwunze (2014) reports that Zimbabwe’s economic empowerment programmes have had a 
negative impact on FDI flows into the country. Policy inconsistency more than the indigenisation 
policy itself has been a problem identified with respect to the application of the IEEA (Shumba, 
2014). Some ministers have been more flexible in the interpretation of this legislation and 
Shumba (2014) suggests that government should draft laws with guidelines for each sector of the 
economy to guide the implementation of the IEEA in future so that investors have a clear 
understanding of the regulations.  There has been a substantial decline in FDI following the more 
radical and populist approach to economic empowerment, including land reform programme. FDI 
outflows increased from 0.05% of GDP in 2007 to 0.47% of GDP in 2012 as investors feared 
losing their investments with these policies (Chiwunze, 2014). 
South Africa 
Kamusoko (2019) notes that South Africa developed its Black Economic empowerment policies 
in three waves starting in 1993 with the selling of Metropolitan Life under Sanlam to black 
shareholders, Metlife Investment Holdings which was a consortium of Black business leaders, 
that later became known as New African Investments Limited (NAIL). With an economic 
downturn in 1998, BEE lost impetus and a second wave of BEE (2000-2014) brought about a 
period of reflection on how it could be improved. During this phase the Black Management Forum 
(BMF) suggested the establishment of a BEE Commission. This suggestion was adopted by the 
ANC.  The purpose of the Commission was to concretise BEE through the adoption of common 
definitions, benchmarks and standards (Kamusoko, 2019). BEE was also broadened from 
ownership of companies to employment equity; preferential procurement policies and skills 
development. The second wave of BEE was designed to benefit more people from more sectors 
and levels of employment. It was not just meant to benefit the elite few (Kamusoko 2019). 
A third wave of BEE was from 2014 onwards and was based on public procurement reforms set 
out in a in a Green Paper. Government procurement was used to develop small, medium and 
micro businesses. Government purchasing of services from SMMEs insisted on compliance with 
BEE regulations (Kamusoko 2019). 
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The main pieces of legislation implemented in the post-apartheid era driving BEE in South Africa 
are summarised below: 
Table 3: Post-Apartheid Empowerment Black Legislation 
Legislation Empowerment component 
Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act, 2003 
Sets out guidelines and codes of good 
practice on BEE and establishing a BEE 
Advisory Council to assist the President on 
BEE implementation 
The National Small Business Act, 1996 Promotes the development of small black 
businesses and capacity building of Black 
entrepreneurs 
The Competition Act, 1998 Designed to improve the numbers of Black 
entrepreneurs participating in the economy 
Employment Equity Act, 1998 The Act requires employers to adopt 
affirmative action in the workplace to increase 
the representation of black people at all levels 
of the workforce. 
The National Empowerment Fund Act, 
1998 
To facilitate funding for BEE 
Source: Author’s own. Data taken from Marazanye (2016), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188222239.pdf  
 
The main instrument to measure progress with implementing BEE requirements in South Africa 
is the balanced scorecard which is part of the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-
BBEE) Codes of Good Practice. The scorecard measures three elements of B-BBEE 
(Marazanye, 2016): 
• Direct empowerment through ownership and control of enterprises and resources; 
• Human resource development and employment equity; and 
• Indirect empowerment through preferential procurement and enterprise development. 
A number of strengths and challenges are evident in South Africa’s black economic 
empowerment policies:    
• Chiwunze (2014) notes that foreign investors favour South Africa’s approach to 
empowerment which is transparent and emphasises preferential treatment as opposed to 
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an asset transfer approach. Whilst there have been declines and increases in FDI, often 
due to global circumstances and other events, FDI inflows and outflows have been 
relatively stable over time since the end of apartheid. 
• South Africa, has a relatively robust regulatory system to oversee the implementation of 
B-BBEE and investigate fronting, various complaints and monitor the implementation of 
the system. Its B-BBEE Commission is the oversight body set up to perform these tasks. 
A B-BBEE Amendment Act (2013) was passed with fairly severe penalties prescribed for 
businesses involved in corruption or fronting. This includes fines and prison sentences. 
This serves as a deterrent for such activities (Warikandwa and Osode, 2017). 
• South Africa’s has various policy programmes, including a comprehensive BEE 
programme to address inequality following apartheid. Horwitz and Jain (2011) highlight 
that some progress has been made in black economic empowerment. For example, 
Black Managers represent 32% of all employees at the top level of management whilst 
Whites comprises 64% at this level and there has been a significant increase in black 
equity ownership and control in South African companies. For example between 1993 
and 1997 Black ownership increased from 1% to 16-17%. However, the country remains 
one of the most equal in the world and inequalities have increased since apartheid 
(World Bank, 2018). There are still high levels of unemployment and gender and racial 
disparities continue to occur in South Africa’s labour market (World Bank, 2018). 
Although there are very high levels of unemployment, skills are difficult to find in the 
workforce. The World Bank (2018) notes that the rigid regulatory environment contributes 
to high unemployment. Small Micro and Medium Enterprises (SMMEs) have also been 
struggling to advance inclusive growth as this sector has been shrinking over time and 
absorbing fewer employees (World Bank, 2018). 
• Despite the revised BEE policies, there is still too much emphasis on transfer of 
ownership that benefits only a small pool of the elite (Marazanye, 2016) 
• The Balanced Scorecard at company level has some weaknesses. For example, the 
scorecard classifies a company as being black empowered based on ownership, 
eventhough senior managers are all White (Marazanye, 2016) 
• Fronting is another problem that bedevils the system. This is where Black managers are 
appointed as window-dressing to give the impression that the company is BEE compliant. 
In this way BEE is circumvented (Shava, 2016 and Marazanye, 2016) 
• Corruption, fraud and nepotism with the tendering process is another perennial problem 
and is often referred to as ‘tenderpreneurship.’ Shava, (2016) notes that decentralisation 
in governance and lack of accountability including at provincial and municipal levels may 
also increase corruption. Most recently this has come to prominence again with the 
supply of Personal Protective Equipment during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Special 
Investigations Unit has been asked to investigate allegations corruption at the provincial 
level concerning the overpricing of PPE amounting to R10.5bn following the tender 
process (Businesstech.co.za, 2020) 
• Compliance issues and the need to streamline processes for the registering of emerging 
Black owned businesses is another obstacle. Many emerging entrepreneurs have skills 
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and capacity shortages and cannot respond effectively to the business registration and 
verification hurdles they are presented with (Shava, 2016). Cohen (2020) argues that a 
reason for the rapid decline in the manufacturing sector may be attributed to this and no 
study has been undertaken on the exact costs of BEE to the economy. Foreign investors 
question their return on investments, noting that the implementation (overhead) costs of 
B-BBEE are high.  
• The lack of monitoring and evaluation of BEE systems is a further weakness especially at 
local government level. Effective monitoring and evaluation systems are necessary to 
ensure accountability in public policy implementation and prevent escalating corruption 
(Shava, 2016) 
 
Land reform in South Africa has been incremental in its approach. The Natives Land Act, No.27, 
1913 and legislation which followed this excluded Black South Africans from ownership of 
approximately 90% of the country’s land. Many Black South Africans were relocated to black 
townships or black ‘homelands’ as a result of apartheid legislation. In 1996, some 60 000 White 
commercial farmers owned almost 70% of land for agricultural purposes and leased a further 
19% (Africa Research Institute, 2013). With the ANC in power land reform was initiated to 
redress population inequalities and landlessness resulting from apartheid. A deadline was set for 
the redistribution of 30% agricultural land by 1999 to Black South Africans. Following delays, this 
deadline was further extended from 2014 to 2025 (Africa Institute, 2013). According to the state’s 
2017 Land Audit, some 72% of agricultural land is still held by Whites, whilst 4% is owned by 
Blacks (Pretorius and Makou, 2019). In South Africa land restitution is another key plank of its 
land reform policy. Land restitution aims to return land or provide compensation to victims who 
lost land under apartheid due to discriminatory laws. Progress with land restitution has been 
significant. The Centre for Development Enterprise (2005) noted that by 2004, about 70 percent 
of the 80 000 claims that were submitted before a 1998 cut off were settled.  
More rapid progress with land reform is hampered by complex legal processes. Section 25 of the 
Constitution protects property rights but also requires the state to give citizens access to land on 
an equitable basis (Africa Institute, 2013). Expropriation is an instrument that government can 
use to acquire land for public projects including land reform. Since 2008 the government has 
attempted to pass expropriation legislation and a new Bill is before Parliament to give effect to 
this, viz: the 2020 Expropriation Bill. The new Bill will require an amendment to the section 25 of 
Constitution that in some instances it is “just and equitable” to pay no compensation for the 
expropriation of property for public purposes. In a further parallel process, an amendment to 
Section 25 of the Constitution has been drafted for discussion and stakeholder input (du Plessis, 
2020). This would facilitate the passing of the new expropriation Bill. In a new land reform 
process, the Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development has announced 
that some 896 state-owned farms would be available for public purchase or lease over a 30-year 
period. This measure will prioritise Black farmers and this earmarked land would be non-
transferrable to ensure that it is used for farming purposes only (Mlaba, 2020). It has been noted 
that South Africa has one of the world most accessible property markets and foreigners are 
allowed to acquire and own property including agricultural property. South Africa is one out of 54 
countries in Africa that is on foreign buyers purchasing radars (Private Property Reporter, 2020). 
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